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NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FINDINGS AND AWARDS OF THE
MISSOURI WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
After a referendum election in 1926, Missouri became the
forty-third state to adopt a Workmen's Compensation Act.' The
purpose of the act was to establish standardized economic bene-
fits for workers injured in industry, without reference to the
common-law rules of liability for negligence. 2 The fundamental
theory is that an injury to an employee, like damage to a
machine, is a burden that should be borne by industry and ulti-
mately paid by those who consume the product of such industry.3
In order to minimize the problems of continued supervision
required by the administration of the act and to secure prompt-
ness of recovery with reduced expense for the injured workman, 4
a commission of three was created 5 to hear and determine all
disputes arising under the act.6 Missouri, after watching the
experiments in other states, undoubtedly felt that an independent
administrative agency could better effectuate the aims of the
legislators than could slower court administration of the act.7
The Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, although
not invested with the judicial power of Article 3 of the Missouri
Constitution, is essentially a statutory board of arbitrators
authorized to hear and determine controversies between employ-
ers and employees., In hearing and determining the facts, it
performs a quasi-judicial function and is less formal than a
court of general jurisdiction., An award made by the commis-
sion acting within the scope of its authority determines the rights
of the parties as effectively as a judgment secured by the regular
1. State ex rel. Elsas v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission
(1928) 318 Mo. 1004, 2 S. W. (2d) 796; State ex rel. Licktenstein v. Mis-
souri Workmen's Compensation Commission (Mo. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 802.
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3301; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co. (1934)
336 Mo. 1000, 82 S. W. (2d) 909; 15 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Work-
men's Compensation (1934) 488; 23 Encyclopedia Britannica, Workmen's
Compensation (1937) 744; Hawker, Administration of State Labor Codes,
Master of Science Thesis Washington University (1935).
3. Ross, The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence In Pro-
ceedings Before Workmen's Compensation Commissions (1923) 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 264; Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
(1930) 201 Wis. 474, 230 N. W. 622.
4. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936) 99.
5. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3354.
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3339.
7. Dodd, Administration of Workmen's Compensation (1936) 98-99.
8. Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Line Corp. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 861, 46 S. W.
(2d) 147.
9. Wyatt v. Kansas City Art Institute (1935) 229 Mo. App. 1166, 88
S. W. (2d) 210.
1937]
Washington University Open Scholarship
100 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY (Vol. 23
legal procedure. It is as binding as a judgment until it is regu-
larly reversed or its validity questioned in the proper manner.10
In those cases in which the parties cannot voluntarily settle
the controversy, the commission makes findings of facts and ap-
plies the, rules of substantive law to the rights and liabilities of
the parties in order to reach an award.11 The review to which
these awards are subject is defined by statute as follows
The final award of the commission shall be conclusive and
binding unless either party to the dispute shall within 30
days from the date of the final award appeal to the circuit
court * * * Such appeal may be taken by filing notice of
appeal with the commission * * * Upon appeal no addi-
tional evidence shall be heard and in the absence of fraud,
the findings of fact made by the commission shall be con-
clusive and binding. The court, on appeal, shall review only
questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for hear-
ing, or set aside the award upon any of the following
grounds and no other:
1. That the commission acted without or in excess of its
powers.
2. That the award was procured by fraud.
3. That the facts found by the commission do not support
the award.
4. That there was not sufficient competent evidence in the
record to warrant the making of the award.1 2
The query naturally arising out of the practical application of
this statute is as to the nature of the judicial attitude of the
courts when reviewing an award of the commission. The ap-
pended chart shows the 55 ultimate reversals which have been
made in the 249 cases appealed from the commission.13
Those cases ultimately reversed, together with others of a
similar nature, will be analyzed to determine whether the courts
follow the intention of the Legislature to establish a simple and
effective means of compensating the injured workman. The
analysis, moreover, will attempt to determine whether the court
uniformly applies the theory and interpretation which it ex-
pounds.
10. Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Corp. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 861, 46 S. W.
(2d) 147.
11. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3339.
12. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3342.
13. This does not include the cases in which extraordinary legal remedies
were sought.
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BASIS OF ULTIMATE REVERSAL Number of
Evidence Findings Error by Cases
ISSUE Insufficient Insufficient Findings of Commission Ultimately
to Support to Support Commission As a Matter Reversed
Findings the Award Not Clear of Law
Change of
Condition
since 2 2 4
Earlier
Award
Existence
of Em-
ployment 1 3 4
Relation-
ship
Injury
within
Scope of 3 2 3 8
Employ-
ment
Cause of
Disability 6 3 9
Amount of
Award 10 2 2 14
Necessity
of Filing
Claim 5 5
within Six
Months
Existence
of a Mis-
souri Con-
tract of 1
Employ-
ment
Existence
of Depen-
dency of 2 4 6
Claimant
Propriety
of Proce- 4 4
dure Taken
TOTAL 24 4 1 26 55
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL STEPS PREREQUISITE
TO AN AWARD14
In the event an injury results from an accident within the
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act, either the employer
or employee may apply to the commission for a hearing upon the
14. This becomes necessary if the parties fail to reach a voluntary agree-
ment. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3338.
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matters at issue and for a ruling thereon. Upon receiving such
application, the commission is required "to immediately set" a
date for a hearing and to notify the parties of the time and place
of such hearing.15 The determination of the suit is by a sum-
mary proceeding conducted either by a referee,-6 an individual
member of the commission or the full commission, 17 dependent
upon the volume of business before the commission. If the first
hearing was not held before the full commission, upon an appli-
cation for review made within ten days from the date of the
award, the full commission is required to review the initial
award. Review by the full commission is a condition precedent
to further appellate review.,8 On this rehearing the full com-
mission has the discretion either to review only evidence already
taken, and to make a final award thereon, or to hear further
evidence. 9 This discretion to hear or exclude new evidence in
reviewing awards cannot be controlled by the courts, except for
unreasonable or arbitrary action. 2  Failure to give notice of
rehearing is held not to be an arbitrary action nor an abuse of
discretion because the parties are charged with knowledge that
the claim became subject to such procedural steps as were pre-
scribed by statute upon the commission's acquisition of juris-
diction of the claim.2'
II. PROCEDURE ON REVIEW OF THE AWARD
The final awards of the commission are conclusive and binding
unless either party appeals to the circuit court within thirty
days of the final award. 22 If, there is no appeal from the award
of the commission, the circuit court upon request of an interested
party renders and notifies the parties of judgment in accordance
with the award. Such judgment has the same effect, and all the
proceedings in relation thereto are the same, as though the judg-
15. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3338.
16. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3357.
17. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3339.
18. Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co. (Mo. 1932). 49 S. IV. (2d) 226;
cf. State ey rel. Randall v. Shain (Mo. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 122.
19. Idem; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3341.
20. Supra, note 16; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Works Company
(1931) 328 Mo. 688, 41 S. W. (2d) 575.
21. Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Company (Mo. 1932) 49 S. W. (2d)
226. "They (parties) had been warned when given notice of the first hear-
ing that they should introduce all their evidence at such hearing. Moreover
it is not contended that they requested a hearing before the full commission,
nor did they suggest or call attention to any additional testimony they might
have offered."
22. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss1/14
ment were a final one rendered in a suit duly heard and deter-
mined by the circuit court.2
3
An appeal, therefore, lies only from a final award of the com-
mission, and any attempt to review a temporary award is pre-
mature. Where a temporary award is made for an indefinite
time, however, a writ of prohibition will lie to test the validity
of the action so that the losing party will not be unduly preju-
diced.2
4
The provision for appeal to the circuit court is the same as
in the appeal of civil actions to the appellate courts. The circuit
court has the status of an intermediate court. Appeals to the
circuit and appellate courts have precedence over all other cases
except election contests. The appeal is taken by filing notice of
an appeal from the final award with the commission. The com-
mission then under its certificate returns to the circuit court all
documents and papers on file in the matter, together with a
transcript of the evidence and the findings and award, which
thereupon become the record of the cause.25 Neither a bill of
exceptions2 6 nor a motion for a new trial in the circuit court is
necessary in order to preserve for appellate review the proceed-
ings and evidence had before the commission.27 A motion for a
new trial is, therefore, ineffective to postpone or extend the
finality of the circuit court decision beyond the term of court in
which it is entered.2s The judgment becomes final at the expira-
tion of the term and cannot be modified or set aside.29 This, how-
ever, is not true of proceedings in the circuit court on the issue
as to whether the award was procured by fraud. The nature of
these proceedings is an equitable one to set aside a judgment,
and the usual rules as to bills of exceptions and motions for a
new trial apply in such a case.30
Since appeal is the same as in civil actions, the courts of ap-
peals have jurisdiction only in those cases in which the amount
23. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3343; Brashear v. Brand-Dunwoody Milling
Co. (Mo. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 191.
24. State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Com-
pensation Commission (Mo. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 897.
25. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3342; Brocco v. May Department Stores (1932)
227 Mo. App. 395, 55 S. W. (2d) 322.
26. Urban v. S. P. Boggess & Son (Mo. 1933) 66 S. W. (2d) 157.
27. State ex rel. May Department Stores v. Haid (1931) 327 Mo. 567,
38 S. W. (2d) 44 overruling Lilly v. Moberly Grocery Co. (Mo. 1930) 32
S. W. (2d) 109, where it was held that bills of exceptions and motions for
a new trial were necessary for appellate review.
28. Supra, notes 24 and 25.
29. Supra, note 26.
30. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Company (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85
S. W. (2d) 551.
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in controversy is less than $7,50031 and no constitutional issue is
directly involved.3 2 If the amount in dispute is more than $7,500"3
or a constitutional issue is raised,'3 4 then the supreme court takes
jurisdiction. The supreme court, however, will examine the rec-
ord to determine the question of its jurisdiction,35 even though its
jurisdiction is not expressly questioned by either party. 0
I1. THE REVIEW
All documents and papers on file in a particular dispute, to-
gether with a transcript of the evidence and the findings and
award of the commission constitute the record of the cause for
purposes of review.3T This record as certified by the commission
imports absolute verity and cannot be collaterally attacked on
review.38 In order to impeach the proceedings of the commission,
the ground for impeachment must appear affirmatively in the
record. It is not to be presumed that there was any irregularity
by which the jurisdiction of the commission to proceed was inter-
rupted or divested.39
Upon appeal no evidence other than that in the record can be
heard, and in the absence of fraud the findings of fact made by
the commission within its powers are conclusive and binding.4
31. Robinson v. Union Electric Light & Power Company (Mo. 1931) 43
S. W. (2d) 912; Sleyster v. Donzelot & Sons (1929) 323 Mo. 822, 20 S. W.
(2d) 69; Guillod v. Kansas City Power & Light Company (1929) 224 Mo.
App. 382, 18 S. W. (2d) 97.
32. Lentz v. Asphalt Paving Company (Mo. 1932) 50 S. W. (2d) 1063.
33. Edwards v. Al Fresco Advertising Company (Mo. 1937) 100 S. W.
(2d) 513; Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Company (Mo. 1937)
100 S. W. (2d) 535.
34. Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Company (1934) 335 Mo. 60, 70 S. W.
(2d) 890.
35. Sleyster v. Donzelot & Sons (1929) 323 Mo. 822, 20 S. W. (2d) 69.
36. Casebolt v. International Life Insurance Company (Mo. 1931) 38
S. W. (2d) 1044; Hardt v. City Ice & Fuel Co. (Mo. 1937) 102 S. W. (2d)
592, the Supreme Court said that it would no longer use "life expectancy"
in order to determine whether the award exceeded $7500.00 and so gave it
jurisdiction.
37. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342; Higgins v. Heine Boiler Company (1931)
328 Mo. 493, 41 S. W. (2d) 565; Brocco v. May Department Stores (1932)
227 Mo. App. 395, 55 S. W. (2d) 322; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron
Works Company (1931) 328 Mo. 688, 41 S. W. (2d) 575.
38. Higgins v. Heine Boiler Company (1931) 328 Mo. 493, 41 S. W. (2d)
575; Weiler v. Peerless White Lime Company (Mo. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d)
125; Brocco v. May Department Stores (1932) 227 Mo. App. 395, 55 S. W.
(2d) 322.
39. Wright v. Penrod, Jurden & Clark Company (1935) 229 Mo. App.
1147, 88 S. W. (2d) 411; Waterman v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Works Com-
pany (1931) 328 Mo. 688, 41 S. W. (2d) 575.
40. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342; Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator (1932)
330 Mo. 596, 50 S. W. (2d) 130.
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The court, on appeal, can review only questions of law41 and can
reverse, modify, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award
upon certain specific grounds and none else.4 2 The Missouri
courts, consequently, have uniformly held that they cannot try
the case de novo nor pass judgment on the weight of the evi-
dence.43 Thus on appeal to the circuit court, that court does not
have the right to set aside a finding of the commission which is
against the weight of the evidence."
Before the commission can take jurisdiction of a case (1) an
accident must have occurred in Missouri45 or the parties must
have been operating under a Missouri contract;41 (2) an em-
ployer-employee relationship must have been established;47 (3)
the accident must have arisen out of and in the course of em-
ployment ;48 (4) the employee must have notified his employer
of the injury within thirty days after the accident;49 and (5)
the employee must have filed his claim for compensation within
six months after the accident.5 This question of jurisdictional
41. Ibid.
42. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3842. "1. That the commission acted without or
in excess of its powers. 2. That the award was procured by fraud. 3. That
the facts found by the commission do not support the award. 4. That there
was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making
of the award."
43. Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Company (1930) 224 Mo. App.
570, 30 S. W. (2d) 650; Jackson v. General Metals Refining Company (Mo.
1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 865; Simmons v. Mississippi River Fuel Corporation
(Mo. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 868.
44. Hammack v. West Plains Lumber Company (1930) 224 Mo. App.
570, 30 S. W. (2d) 650; Cf. Adams v. Lilbourn Grain Company (1932) 226
Mo. App. 1030, 48 S. W. (2d) 147, 1. c. 150. "If the verdict of jury-the
finding of the commission-is incomprehensible on any theory consistent
with a proper regard for their duty to determine the issues accordingly to
law and evidence; then it was the duty of the circuit court to set aside the
finding."
45. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3310.
46. Idem; Wadley v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation (1931) 225
Mo. App. 631, 37 S. W. (2d) 665; Cf. Weiderhoff v. Neal (D. C. W. D.
Mo. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 798.
47. Barlow v. Shawnee Investment Company (1932) 229 Mo. App. 1, 48
S. W. (2d) 35.
48. Rinehart v. Stamper Company (1932) 229 Mo. App. 653, 55 S. W.
(2d) 729.
49. Newman v. Rice Stix Dry Goods Company (1934) 335 Mo. 572, 73
S. W. (2d) 264, 94 A. L. R. 751; Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving
Products (1930) 224 Mo. App. 304, 25 S. W. (2d) 529.
50. Wheeler v. Missouri Pacific R. R. (Mo. 1930) 33 S. W. (2d) 179;
Murphy v. Burlington Overall Company (1931) 225 Mo. App. 866, 34 S. W.
(2d) 1035; Konstron v. American Packing Company (1931) 227 Mo. App.
34, 45 S. W. (2d) 871; Helle v. Eyerman Contracting Company (Mo. 1931)
44 S. W. (2d) 234; Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Products (1930)
224 Mo. App. 304, 25 S. W. (2d) 529; Cunliff, The Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Law (1937) 5 Kansas City L. Rev. 240, 1. c. 245.
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fact, like any other question of fact, must be determined by the
commission. If the evidence as to the jurisdictional fact is dis-
puted or in conflict, the findings of fact by the commission are
binding and conclusive, provided they are supported by any sub-
stantial evidence.- The court on review, however, can deter-
mine for itself whether as a matter of law the assumption of
jurisdiction by the commission was justified by the facts so
found.
Since the Missouri courts accept the record of the commission
as presented52 and have no jurisdiction to make their own find-
ings of fact,5 3 their attitude towards the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission as a quasi-judicial administrative agency 4 can
be said to be contrary to that of the federal courts. The United
States Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson- held that the courts
have a right to review both questions of law ,and of fact where a
jurisdictional fact is involved, and that the determination of
such fact by an administrative tribunal, whether or not the evi-
dence is in conflict, is not conclusive upon the courts.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals has held that it is unnecessary
for the commission to make an express finding in every award
that there was compliance with its jurisdictional limitations."
Under somewhat analogous circumstances in the "Hot Oil" case, 7
the Supreme Court of the United States has held that in every
administrative order (award) issued by an administrative officer
(agency) the specific fact or primary standard which gives him
the power to make such order must be expressly stated. Had
they imposed this requirement, the Missouri courts would have
been forced to reverse every compensation case ever appealed, be-
cause the commission has never observed this requirment. There
51. Wadley v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation (1931) 225 Mo.
App. 631, 37 S. W. (2d) 665.
52. Ritchie v. Rayville Coal Company (1930) 224 Mo. App. 1128, 33
S. W. (2d) 154.
53. Glaze v. Hart (1931) 225 Mo. App. 1205, 36 S. W. (2d) 684; Teague
v. Laclede Christy Clay Products Company (1932) 331 Mo. 147, 52 S. W.(2d) 880, reversing circuit court for making its own findings of facts and
directing the commission to make an award in accordance with such find-
ings.
54. Pfitzinger v. Shell Pipe Line Corp. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 861, 46
S. W. (2d) 955; Wyatt v. Kansas City Art Institute (1935) 229 Mo. App.
1166, 88 S. W. (2d) 210.
55. (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. ed. 598.
56. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Products Co. (1930) 224 Mo.
App. 304, 25 S. W. (2d) 529. While this case has been partially disapproved
by Wheeler v. Mo. Pac. R. R. (1931) 328 Mo. 88, 42 S. W. (2d) 579, this
particular statement is still good law.
57. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293 U. S. 389, 55 S. Ct. 241,
79 L. ed. 446.
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is, however, a prima facie presumption in favor of the commis-
sion's jurisdiction.-8 In practice, therefore, the commission's fail-
ure to make an express finding with reference to jurisdictional
facts does not serve to invalidate the award. An affirmative con-
tention that the commission has acted outside its jurisdiction is
necessary. 5
The award of the commission has been held to have the force
and effect of a special verdict 0 or of the verdict of a jury.6 The
findings in the award are conclusive if supported by substantial
competent evidence. -62 In order to determine whether the evidence
sustains the finding the evidence must be viewed in its most favor-
able light,63 even though a contrary conclusion would be sup-
ported by the evidence.64 Thus, where the facts are in dispute,
the findings of the commission are conclusive and binding; they
are subject to attack only on the ground that there was no sub-
stantial evidence to support them.65 The question, what is sub-
stantial evidence, will be discussed in a later portion of this note.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in seeking to determine
whether the facts found by the commission support its award"
said in State ex rel. Buttiger v. Haid67
58. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Products (1930) 224 Mo. App.
304, 25 S. W. (2d) 529; Brown v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (Mo. 1936)
98 S. W. (2d) 129.
59. Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Products (1930) 224 Mo. App.
304, 25 S. W. (2d) 529.
60. Decker v. Raymond Concrete Pile Company (1935) 336 Mo. 1116,
82 S. W. (2d) 267; Noto v. Hemp & Company (Mo. 1935) 83 S. W. (2d)
136; Wetter v. Mechanics Iron Works (Mo. 1932) 49 S. W. (2d) 236;
Murphy v. St. Louis County Water Company (Mo. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d)
69.
61. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Company (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85
S. W. (2d) 551; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Company (1934) 336 Mo.
1000; 82 S. W. (2d) 909; King v. Mark Twain Hotel Company (Mo. 1933)
60 S. W. (2d) 675; Seebers v. O'Dell (Mo. 1933) 60 S. W. (2d) 678; Morris
v. Dexter Mfg. Company (1931) 225 Mo. App. 449, 40 S. W. (2d) 750.
62. Noto v. Hemp & Co. (Mo. 1935) 83 S. W. (2d) 136; Hoffman v.
Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. (Mo. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 427; Darghe v. Blackburn
Const. Co. (Mo. 1932) 53 S. W. (2d) 1088; Huffstutler v. Oklahoma Con-
tracting Co. (Mo. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 738; Thomas v. Kaysing Iron Works
(Mo. 1932) 54 S. W. (2d) 763.
63. Jackson v. General Metals Refining Corp. (Mo. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d)
865; Brewen v. Ash Grove Lime & Portland Cement Co. (1930) 223 Mo.
App. 983, 25 S. W. (2d) 1086; Lanahan v. Hydraulic-Press Brick Com-
pany (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 327; Herndon v. Robertson Const. Co.
(1933) 227 Mo. App. 694, 59 S. W. (2d) 75.
64. Yancey v. Egyptian Tie & Timber Co. (Mo. 1936) 95 S. W. (2d)
1230.
65. Cottingham v. General Materials Company (Mo. 1934) 70 S. W.
(2d) 101; Simmons v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. (Mo. 1931) 43 S. W.
(2d) 868.
66. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342.
67. (1932) 330 Mo. 1930, 51 S. W. (2d) 1008.
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The general finding of the commission necessarily implies
the finding of every fact necessary to support the general
finding. It is the finding of facts, not the failure to find facts
which would defeat the award. Laws 1925, p. 375, section
44 [Section 3342] * * * a court may set aside an award,
not because the conmission failed to find facts which would
support it. It must be an affirmative finding of facts which
would make the award improper; facts inconsistent with
the award * * *. That the commission must make an affirma-
tive specific finding of every fact necessary to authorize the
award in order to make the award valid is an interpretation
contrary to ground 3 [of present section 3342] * * *
The Buttiger case was modified by later cases which held that
there must be a finding of the ultimate constitutive facts upon
which the award can be predicated as a matter of law. In theory,
evidentiary facts are excluded. 68 Although the finding may be
general, it must nevertheless be unequivocal and definite . 0
If there is a conflict in the evidence, the commission has the
duty to determine which evidence will prevail, and its deter-
mination thereof is conclusive on appeal.70 But if the issues or
the facts are undisputed, the situation merely calls for a deter-
mination of the legal effects of the facts in evidence.,' It is
often difficult to draw a distinction between a finding of an
ultimate fact and a conclusion of law. The Supreme Court of
Missouri has said that the distinction depends upon whether the
finding is reached by natural reasoning or by the application of
fixed rules of law.72 Thus, if an ultimate conclusion can be
reached only by applying a rule of law, the result so reached is
a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact.73 The commission
cannot be reversed for error, as a matter of law, merely because
it may have had in mind the wrong section of the Act in reaching
an award, provided, however, that the award is otherwise proper,
68. Leilich v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 112, 40 S. W. (2d)
601. State ex rel. Probst v. Haid (1933) 333 Mo. 390, 62 S. W. (2d) 869.
69. Buesing v. Moon Motor Car Co. (1932) 227 Mo. App. 372, 54 S. W.
(2d) 734, when the court held that a definite award for a definite period
is not supported by a finding and statement that the future disability is
unknown and cannot be determined.
70. Renick v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (Mo. 1936) 95 S. W. (2d) 872. Lurnpkin
v. Sheidley Realty Co. (1932) 227 Mo. App. 306, 53 S. W. (2d) 386.
71. Sawtell v. Stern Bros. & Co. (1931) 226 Mo. App. 485, 44 S. W.
(2d) 264; Keithley v. Stone & Webster Enginering Corp. (1932) 226 Mo.
App. 1112, 49 S. W. (2d) 296; Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co. (1934) 336
Mo. 1000, 82 S. W. (2d) 909.
72. Maltz v. Jackoway-Katz Cap Co. (1934) 336 Mo. 1000, 82 S. W.
(2d) 909.
73. Ibid.
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within the power of the commission, and that there is no collu-
sion, fraud, or advantage taken of the defendants.7 4
The fourth ground of reversal of an award of the commission
is that the award was procured by "fraud." This does not mean
that the losing party may, on allegations of false testimony or
misrepresentation of the facts by witnesses before the commis-
sion, produce further evidence on the issues tried before the
commission and thus obtain another trial in the circuit court.7 5
It is not "fraud" for the full commission, on reviewing the award
of a single commissioner, to fail to give notice to the parties or
to fail to hear additional testimony, because that is in the discre-
tion of the commission.76 It is for the commission to determine
all material issues and to pass upon the credibility of witnesses.
When the commission's final award is made, all such questions
of fact are finally settled and cannot be retried.77 The basis of a
reversal on the ground of fraud is that the fraud is of such a
nature as is required to set aside a judgment in a suit in equity
on the ground that it was obtained by fraud, namely: that there
was fraud which was practiced in the very act of procuring the
award; that there was fraud which operated not upon matters
relating to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it
was obtained; that there was fraud which prevented the losing
party from presenting his defense or case; or that there was
fraud as to the extrinsic, collateral acts or matters, not examined
and determined in the hearing before the commission.7s The
three grounds for the reversal of an award other than for fraud79
call for court rulings purely of law and apply to matters neces-
sarily appearing upon the face of the record made before the
commission. As to fraud, the situation obviously is different, for
it can hardly be expected that matters fraudulent in their nature,
and going to the procurement of the award, would show in the
record of the cause certified by the commission to the circuit
court. Consequently if that particular ground of appellate re-
view is to serve any beneficial purpose in the administration of
the law, the court must be permitted to hear new evidence of its
own accord and not be confined to the record. This seems to be
74. Cobb v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. (Mo. 1931) 31 S. W. (2d) 573.
75. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85 S. W.(2d) 551.
76. Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co. (Mo. 1931) 49 S. W. (2d) 226.
77. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85 S. W.(2d) 551; State ex rel. Sei v. Raid (1933) 332 Mo. 1061, 61 S. W. (2d) 950.
78. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85 S. W.(2d) 551.
79. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342.
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the only exception to the general rule which denies the power to
introduce new evidence in a reviewing court. 0 In such a case
the usual rules as to bills of exceptions and motions for a new
trial must prevail in order to have appellate review of the circuit
court action relating to the issue of fraud.8 '
IV. RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE
Of the total number of cases ultimately reversed, 44% are
reversed because of insufficient evidence to support the findings
of the commission. This makes the question of the reception of
evidence by the commission an important one. The technical
rules governing the introduction of evidence in an ordinary court
trial do not prevail in the informal and summary proceedings
before the commission. 82 The admission of incompetent evidence
does not necessarily make an award reversible if there is other
competent evidence upon which to base the award. The commis-
sion cannot reject competent material evidence offered by either
party. 3 The award must be based upon competent evidence, not
upon mere speculation, conjecture, or opinion of the commis-
sion.8 4
If there is a conflict in evidence, it is the duty of the commis-
sion to determine which evidence shall prevail.8 ' So long as there
is any substantial evidence to support the findings of the com-
mission, the courts are without power to interfere." In the last
analysis, the scope of the power of the courts in reviewing awards
hinges upon the interpretation of the word "substantial." To
determine whether there is "substantial" evidence in any case
is merely a matter of judicial opinion. In Kenser v. Ely Walker
Dry Goods Co.87 the Springfield Court of Appeals affirmed the
circuit court's reversal of an award of the commission denying
compensation because the award was not supported by the testi-
mony of one physician who saw the employee only once while
she was in a hospital and of another physician who examined
her about forty days after her alleged injury. This testimony
80. Schmelze v. Ste. Genevieve Lime & Quarry Co. (Mo. 1931) 37 S. W.(2d) 482, 1. c. 484.
81. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85 S. W.
(2d) 551.
82. 2 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation (2 ed. 1932) 1755, secs. 507,
and 551; Willis v. Berberich's Delivery Co. (Mo. 1937) 98 S. W. (2d) 569;
Nordhaus v. Lichtman Printing Co. (Mo. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 422.
83. Willis v. Berberich's Delivery Co. (Mo. 1937) 98 S. W. (2d) 569.
84. Allison v. Eyermann Const. Co. (Mo. 1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 1063;
Jackson v. Aetna Bricklaying Co. (Mo. 1933) 59 S. W. (2d) 705.
85. Burgstrand v. Crcwe Coal Co. (1934) 336 Mo. 119, 77 S. W. (2d) 97.
86. Duckworth v. City of Macon (Mo. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 206.
87. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1016, 48 S. W. (2d) 167.
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was controverted by strong testimony of the claimant's co-em-
ployees and two attending physicians who substantiated the
claimant's contention that the disability had resulted from an
injury received in the course of her employment. The court de-
cided that "there was no evidence of probative force that it [the
injury] was due to causes independent of said employment."
In another case88 the evidence in the record seemed to show
that the deceased employee had died of carbon monoxide poison-
ing after unloading tractors from freight cars in the course of
employment. The only conflicting testimony was that of a physi-
cian who stated, as an "expert," that in his opinion the evidence
did not prove carbon monoxide poisoning. The award of the
commission denying compensation was reversed, even though
there was some evidence to support it. The reason for the re-
versal was that it was rationally impossible to contend that any-
thing other than carbon monoxide had caused the death. The
two cases are rather extreme in their results. They seem to
show that disputed facts are being weighed by the reviewing
courts, even though such a practice is theoretically impossible
under the Act.
Hearsay and self-serving declarations not a part of the res
gestae are, when standing alone, incompetent and insufficient to
warrant the making of an award.89 Hearsay evidence, however,
is not objectionable, where the commission did not consider it
in its findings,90 or where it is corroborated by other significant
facts in the case, 91 or where there is sufficient competent evidence
to support the finding.92 If the hearsay is not objected to at the
proper time in the proceeding, it can be considered and given
its natural probative value.93 This flexibility in the introduction
of hearsay does not necessarily mean that the commission will
recklessly permit any and all hearsay evidence to be introduced.94
88. Adams v. Lilbourn Grain Co. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1030, 48 S. W.
(2d) 147.
89. Huelsman v. Stute & Co. (Mo. 1930) 28 S. W. (2d) 387.
90. Lamkins v. Copper Malleable Range Corp. (Mo. 1931) 42 S. W. 941.
91. Supra, note 86.
92. Supra, note 87.
93. Supra, note 86; Tralle v. Chevrolet Motor Car Co. (Mo. 1936) 92
S. W. (2d) 966, Employer who elicited hearsay evidence from witness on
hearing is held to have waived objection to testimony as hearsay; Munton
v. A. Driemeier Storage & Moving Co. (1930) 223 Mo. App. 1124, 22 S. W.
(2d) 61. Hearsay statements by employee that he injured his neck while
moving piano were preserved in a certified copy of testimony taken before
a coroner. Such testimony admitted without objection, was held to be
sufficient to support the award of the commission.
94. DeMoss v. Evens & Howard Fire Brick (Mo. 1933) 57 S. W. (2d)
720, where the commission rejected the testimony of a fellow employee of
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The determination of the credibility of witnesses has always
been held to be the function of the commission.2 The power of
the commission to disregard the judgments of experts and skilled
witnesses, nevertheless, is limited when the subject is one for
experts or skilled witnesses alone and the commission cannot be
presumed to have properly formed correct opinions of its own.90
In determining whether substantial evidence sustains the
award of the commission, the reviewing courts will consider only
the evidence favorable to support the award97 or the claim of the
injured employee.9 8 Other presumptions indulged in by the courts
are that the commission acted properly and regularly in making
its review,99 and that there was no irregularity in the proceed-
ings.100 It follows that the commission found every fact neces-
sary to support its award which was substantiated by other com-
petent evidence.' If the award was signed by only two members
of the commission, a presumption arises that the commissioners
acted in accordance with the statute which requires review by
three members unless there is a vacancy on the commission.2
DeMoss who some time during the same morning of the alleged accident
saw and spoke with DeMoss about it. The appellate court in ultimately
affirming the commission held that there was lack of proof that any con-
versation between DeMoss and his fellow employee was spontaneous, made
under the influence of the accident, and within its immediate surroundings
so as to have brought it within the rule of res gestae; Hatfield v. South-
western Grocer Co. (Mo. 1937) 104 S. W. (2d) 717, where a statement
made by employee to his wife concerning his alleged disability when he
returned from work was held inadmissible as res gestae because it was
merely a narrative of past events; Freese v. St. Louis Public Service Co.(Mo. 1933) 58 S. W. (2d) 758.
95. Stepaneck v. Mark Twain Hotel (Mo. 1937) 104 S. W. (2d) 761.
96. Kane v. St. Louis Refrigeration Transit Co. (Mo. 1935) 83 S. W.(2d) 593, 596. The commission was ultimately reversed because "the
question as to whether Kane (employee) was suffering with bilateral lobar
pneumonia at the time he met with his accident is not within the knowl-
edge of layman, and the commission had no power to disregard the uncon-
tradicted evidence of three qualified expert witnesses."
97. Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal Co. (1934) 336 Mo. 119, 77 S. W. (2d)
97; Elihinger v. Wolf House Furn. Co. (Mo. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 144.
98. Griffin v. Anderson Motor Service Co. (1933) 227 Mo. App. 855, 59
S. W. (2d) 805; Stapleton v. Gunn (Mo. 1934) 69 S. W. (2d) 1104; 2
Schneider Workman's Compensation, sec. 536a.
99. Higgins v. Heine Boiler Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 493, 41 S. W. (2d) 565;
Schrabauer v. Schneider Engraving Products (1930) 224 Mo. App. 304,
25 S. W. (2d) 529; Schmelze v. Ste. Genevieve Lime & Quarry Co. (Mo.
1931) 37 S. W. (2d) 482.
100. Waterman v. Chicago Boiler & Iron Works (1931) 328 Mo. 688, 41
S. W. (2d) 575.
1. Phillips v. Air Reduction Sales Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 587, 85 S. W. (2d)
551.
2. Beck v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Mo. 1932) 48 S. W. (2d)
213. Cf. State ex rel. Randall v. Shain (Mo. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 122.
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V. FINAL ACTION ON REVIEW
The Workmen's Compensation Act provides that on appeal
from an award of the commission, the court shall review only
questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for a rehear-
ing, or set aside the award only upon certain specified grounds.3
The reviewing court may not reduce the compensation period
fixed in the award of the commission, because that would be
invading the province of the commission in weighing the evi-
dence in making the award.4 The Kansas City Court of Appeals
has held, however, that if the commission erred as a matter of
law in computing the award, a remittitur decision for the excess
amount may be granted on review.5 A final award reached by
the commission may be reversed or set aside on the ground that
the commission acted "without or in excess of its powers.",, The
reviewing court also has the power to remand the case to the
commission. A remand for rehearing is required only when there
are facts present or prospective that must be determined7 or
when there is no substantial evidence to support the comnmis-
sion's finding of fact.8 Because the rehearing held by the com-
mission is the same as though the case had never been heard
before and the judgment of the reviewing court is only the law
of the case if the evidence on the rehearing is the same as at
the former hearing,9 the reviewing court cannot instruct the
commission to award compensation in an amount authorized by
law.10 Any judgment issued by the circuit court is not subject
to collateral attack by motion to quash execution on the judgment
unless want of jurisdiction of the court to render judgment
affirmatively appears (on the face of the record)." In the event
that the same case is appealed more than once, the points deter-
mined on the first appeal are law for the second hearing and all
subsequent proceedings in the case.12 In the majority of the
3. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 3342.
4. Harbour v. Gardner (Mo. 1931) 38 S. W. (2d) 295.
5. Schutz v. Great Amer. Ins. Co. (Mo. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 904. This
is the only case of its kind in Mo.
6. Higgins v. Heine Boiler Co. (1931) 328 Mo. 493, 41 S. W. (2d) 565.
7. Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 60, 70 S. W. (2d)
890; Powell v. Ford Motor Co. (Mo. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 572.
8. Estes v. General Chemical Clay Co. (Mo. 1936) 93 S. W. (2d) 295.
9. Brocco v. May Dept. Stores (1932) 227 Mo. App. 395, 55 S. W. (2d)
322.
10. Russell v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co. (1933) 332 Mo. 645, 60
S. W. (2d) 44, 87 A. L. R. 953; Schulz v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
(1932) 331 Mo. 616, 56 S. W. (2d) 126.
11. Kristanik v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (1934) 335 Mo. 60, 70 S. W. (2d)
890.
12. Bomar v. J. A. Kreis & Sons (Mo. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 205.
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cases the awards of the commission have been ultimately affirmed
by the courts.13
VI. EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES
Extraordinary legal remedies have been sought in approxi-
mately five percent of those Workmen's Compensation cases re-
viewed by the courts. In about one-half of these cases, the writ
of certiorari was sought. Certiorari may be directed by the su-
preme court to the courts of appeals to determine whether any
conflict in the interpretation of the Missouri Workmen's Com-
pensation law has arisen between the opinions of the courts of
appeals and the opinions of the supreme court.14 In the case of
a temporary or partial award of the commission, certiorari may
also be directed by a circuit court to the commission proper to
determine from the commission's record whether the commission
has abused, gone beyond, or exceeded its powers.'15 On certiorari
the supreme court cannot merely substitute its own judgment
on the facts for that of the court of appeals to determine whether
the court of appeals has erred in its application of the rules of
law to the facts.16
Writs of mandamus have been granted where the commission
erred in declining to accept jurisdiction of a claim"7 or where
the commission failed in its mandatory duty to certify the record
to the circuit court without demanding payment of fees when a
claimant filed notice of appeal. 8 At one time there was a ques-
tion whether mandamus proceedings against the commission
would lie only in the supreme court or also in the courts of ap-
peals. It was contended that the right of mandamus proceedings
against the commission was vested only in the supreme court
according to the Missouri constitution, Article 6, Section 12, be-
cause the commission was a state officer. Reasoning backwards
13. Burgstrand v. Crowe Coal (1934) 336 Mo. 119, 77 S. W. (2d) 97.
14. State ex rel. Sei v. Haid (1933) 332 Mo. 1061, 61 S. W. (2d) 950;
State ex rel. Probst v. Haid (1933) 333 Mo. 390, 62 S. W. (2d) 869; State
ex rel. Superior Mineral Co. v. Hostetter (1935) 337 Mo. 718, 85 S. W. (2d)
743; State ex rel. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hostetter (Mo. 1937)
98 S. W. (2d) 683.
15. State ex rel. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Richardson (1933) 227
Mo. App. 1221, 61 S. W. (2d) 409.
16. State ex rel. Sei v. Haid (1933) 332 Mo. 1061, 61 S. W. (2d) 950;
State ex rel. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hostetter (Mo. 1937).
17. State ex rel. Elsas v. Missouri Workman's Compensation Commis-
sion (Mo. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 796; State ex rel. Licktenstein v. Missouri
Workman's Compensation Commission (Mo. 1928) 2 S. W. (2d) 802; State
ex rel. Weaver v. Missouri Workman's Compensation Commission (Mo.
1936) 95 S. W. (2d) 641.
18. State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workman's Compensation Com-
mission (1932) 225 Mo. App. 59, 32 S. W. (2d) 142.
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from the conclusion that the commission, and not its individual
members, was the only possible party respondent in a position
to comply with its command, the Supreme Court of Missouri held
that the commission, being a legal entity and a quasi-corporation,
was not a state officer.19 Since the commission is not a state
officer, the courts of appeals has jurisdiction in an original
mandamus proceeding against it.2o
The only time the writ of prohibition has been granted against
the commission is State ex rel. Bremen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Mis-
souri Workmen's Compensation Commission2i in which the juris-
diction of the commission over a claim arising from an accident
outside of the state was reviewed. The supreme court in that
case held that, while the commission is not invested with the
judicial power in the sense of Article 3, of the Missouri consti-
tution, it is authorized to hear and determine controversies be-
tween employer and employee. This determination of facts is
clearly a judicial function, and the writ of prohibition is applica-
ble whenever judicial functions are assumed which do not right-
fully belong to the person or the court exercising them.
Despite an admission by the court that the relator could have
had an adequate judicial review of the finding and rulings of the
commission including the question of the usurpation of power,
had he followed the procedure outlined in the Act,22 the court
granted the writ of prohibition because at the time of that case
the Workmen's Compensation Act was new and it was in the
public interest to settle some of the questions involved at the
earliest possible moment instead of following the procedure estab-
lished by statute.
Today in view of the inapplicability of the public policy con-
siderations successfully urged in the case just considered coupled
with the adequate provisions for judicial review of awards of the
commission afforded by the Act2 3 it seems improbable that the
writ of prohibition will frequently be issued against the Missouri
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
CONCLUSION
Analysis discloses that fifty-five cases, or approximately 22%
of the compensation awards reviewed by the courts, have ulti-
19. State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workman's Compensation Com-
mission (1930) 325 Mo. 153, 27 S. W. (2d) 1026.
20. State ex rel. Goldman v. Missouri Workman's Compensation Com-
mission (1930) 225 Mo. App. 59, 32 S. W. (2d) 142.
21. State ex rel. Brewen-Clark Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workman's Com-
pensation Commission (Mo. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d) 897.
22. R. S. (1929) sec. 3342.
23. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3342.
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mately been reversed.24 This appears to be a rather large per-
centage. It should be noted, however, that only about one-half
of these cases have been reversed for reasons other than error
by the commission on a question of law.25 With few exceptions,
these reversals are not open to criticism. In fact, in the majority
of the reversals the commission, rather than the courts, is to be
criticized. Had the commission made itself more clear in its
awards, fewer cases would have been reversed.
Determination of what is sufficient or substantial evidence has
been the most vexing problem. While the Missouri courts have
disavowed repeatedly any desire to consider evidence unfavor-
able to the commission's findings, one cannot help feeling that in
several of the cases reversed that action was influenced by the
court's conviction that the preponderance of the evidence was
against the award of the commission, and that the courts have
not always limited themselves to determination of whether there
was substantial evidence in support of the findings.
Generally speaking the Missouri courts have adopted a liberal
approach in reviewing the awards of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commission. Illustrative of this judicial broad-mindedness
is the Missouri attitude towards the problem of jurisdictional
facts, whch is one of the most liberal in the country.2 It has
followed from the liberality of court review in Missouri that the
objectives of the Workmen's Compensation Act have been better
effectuated there than in most states. This is not to say that the
degree of finality afforded, to commission awards is all that the
proponents of administrative adjudication in this field would
demand. Missouri has not, of course, lent the absolute practical
finality to the commission awards, which has been afforded, for
example, in the Canadian provincesY.2  But as interpretation
makes more definite the general provisions of the Compensation
Act, and as the commission perfects its own technique, it is
highly probable that increased finality will be afforded. With
such a development one may be able to say without qualification
that the objectives of prompt, inexpensive, and certain compen-
sation for injured workingmen had been attained.
JOSEPH KUTTEN.
24. See chart, supra.
25. There is a close similarity between these percentages and those in
an administrative law paper, Judicial Review of Findings and Awards of
the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, written by Prof. Robert
L. Howard at Harvard Law School in 1933.
26. Haines & Dimock, Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental
Administration (1935) 147-151.
27. Id. at 169.
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